Justispolitisk spalte: Arbeiderpartiet og abort

Injuria.no • 3. mars 2019

Skrevet av Matias Alexander Baltazar Birkeland og Fredrik Vingsnes,
jusstudenter og medlemmer av Arbeiderpartiet i Bergen. Foto: Privat

 

Vi jusstudenter vel kjent med at lovverket blir brukt aktivt for å fremme politiske avveininger og kompromiss. Sluttproduktet av dette er gjerne det metodelæren kategoriserer som lovgiverviljen. I praksis kan det innebærer å vedta, fjerne eller endre en lov. Norge er den anerkjente rettsstaten vi er i dag fordi vi har hatt en aktiv og fremtidsrettet demokratisk lovgiver opp gjennom historien.

Arbeiderpartiet har stått fremst i kampen for rettigheter vi idag tar som en selvfølge. Det var ikke gitt at kvinner skulle få stemmerett i 1913 - det var ikke før Høyre gjorde helomvending og ville stemme for, at forslaget fikk flertall.

Det var heller ikke gitt at ekteskapsloven skulle være kjønnsnøytral, slik at alle par, homofile, heterofile, eller alt imellom, juridisk sett er fullstendig likestilte. Selv om mange i dag tar for gitt at ekteskapsloven er kjønnsnøytral, var det ikke uten motstand at Stoltenberg-regjeringen vedtok lovendringen.

Reservasjonsretten for leger

Våren 2014 raste saken om reservasjonsretten for leger. Høyre- og FrP regjeringen ville legge til rette for at leger skulle få slippe å henvise til abort. Dette ville ført til at kvinner som ønsket å ta abort, men møtte en “vanskelig” fastlege, risikerte å bli kastet rundt i helsevesenet på jakt etter “rett” fastlege for å få oppfylt sine rettigheter etter loven.

Arbeiderpartiet har hele tiden vært krystallklare på at alle som jobber i helsevesenet har plikt til å gi pasientene det de har krav på etter loven. Ingen skal påføre kvinner ekstra belastninger på grunn av egne samvittighetskvaler. De som tror at abort er et enkelt valg, bør revurdere egen bakkekontakt.

Heldigvis tok ti-tusenvis av kvinner og menn til motmæle, blant annet på 8. mars, kvinnedagen. Rekordstore demonstrasjoner mot lovendringen ga resultater. Regjeringen ga opp forslaget.

Abort

Loven om selvbestemt abort ble innført av Odvar Nordlis Arbeiderparti-regjering til store protester fra høyresiden. Loven var et radikalt likestillingsprosjekt i favør kvinners rettigheter, på bekostning av tidligere kristenkonservativ tenking om fosterets stilling.

I dag har Norge selvbestemt abort frem til uke 12 i svangerskapet. Hvis abort ønskes etter uke 12 må kvinnen møte i en nemnd å forklare hvorfor en ikke har mulighet til å bære frem barnet.

For Arbeiderpartiet er kvinners selvbestemmelsesrett ufravikelig - åpenbart i motsetning til dagens regjering. Arbeiderpartiet i Bergen ønsker å utvide adgangen for fri abort fra 12 uker til 18 uker og dermed fjerne abortnemndenes betydning. Det er ingen medisinske årsaker til at vi ikke kan ha selvbestemt abort frem til uke 18. Derfor bør det være helt og holdent opp til kvinnen selv å bestemme.

Det hører ikke hjemme i 2019 å ha en ordning der kvinner må møte en nemnd for å utbrodere egen livssituasjon for å kunne ta abort. Det er, og skal være, den enkeltes valg - uansett. Dette forstod svenskene allerede på 70 tallet, som har hatt samme liberale praksis - som Arbeiderpartiet med flere tar til ordet for - i nærmere 50 år.

Fosterreduksjon - klarer du en, klarer du to?

Barne- og familieminister Kjell Ingolf Ropstad famøse uttalelse om fosterreduksjon har spredt seg som ild i tørt gress på sosiale medier. Regjeringspartiene Høyre, FrP, Venstre og KrF sitt nye forslag innebærer at kvinner som er gravid med to tvillinger, ikke har anledning til å abortere bort ett av fostrene uten å stille i abortnemnd og få nemndas velsignelse. Regjeringens “nye” system er det samme som for selvbestemt abort etter uke 12. Den samme praksis som svenskene ble kvitt for nærmere 50 år siden.

Til tross for at kvinnen allerede har gjort seg opp en mening om familiens situasjon, kapasitet, økonomi, og andre personlige forhold, og tatt en avgjørelse, anser regjeringen seg mer kompetent til å vite og bestemme hva som er best for kvinnen og den enkelte familie.

Resultatet blir fort at man aborterer bort begge fostrene. Dette vil være en stor påkjenning for den enkelte, og kan umulig harmonere med KrF og Høyre sitt overordnede mål om reduserte aborttall.

Helseminister Bent Høie sier det selv: “Det betyr at fosterreduksjon ikke lenger skal være selvbestemt.” Han presiserer samtidig at “Kvinnens vurdering av egen situasjon skal tillegges vekt”. Hva nå enn det skulle bety.

For hvis kvinnen ønsker abort, kan virkelig Høie og Ropstad mene at andre momenter enn akkurat kvinnens eget ønske skal tillegges større vekt?

Som kommende jurister er vi godt drillet i skjønnsmessige helhetsvurderinger. For oss i Arbeiderpartiet er det åpenbart at den helhetsvurderingen skal tas av kvinnen selv, ikke av Høie og Ropstad sin abortnemnd.

 

Av Hannah M. Behncke, Eylül Sahin and Sabrina Eriksen Zapata – ELSA Bergen, Human Rights, Researchgruppen 24. april 2025
Oppression isn’t always loud - it can be the quiet erasure of culture and language, stripping minorities of their freedom to express who they are. Language and culture are two of the most important means to keep one's identity alive. Unfortunately, many minorities face extreme repression regarding their background. The Kurdish ability to perform their culture in Turkey has been a long struggle. This is still the case today, where the Kurdish minority face backlash for speaking their language. This article will look into the Kurdish fight to protect their identity in Turkey. To gain a deeper understanding of the diverse perspectives on this issue, we interviewed a Kurdish and a Turkish citizen of Turkey about their views on the Turkish state's treatment of Kurds. Legal basis Although several international legal frameworks exist to protect minority cultures and languages, Turkey has not incorporated them into its legal system. Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights explicitly states that “minorities shall not be denied the right […] to enjoy their culture, [...] or to use their own language.” However, despite ratifying the ICCPR, Turkey made a reservation excluding Article 27. Similarly, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages requires minority languages to be accessible in education, judicial court proceedings, and in the media. However, Turkey has not ratified this charter. Domestically, the Turkish constitution does not recognize Kurds as a minority. In fact, article 42 explicitly prohibits the “teaching of any language other than Turkish as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens”.1 As a result, the Kurdish language lacks legal protection, unlike Ladino, Greek, and Armenian, which are safeguarded under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).2 Historical overview After the Ottoman Empire's collapse, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres promised Kurdish autonomy, but the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne nullified it, dividing Kurdistan among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria without self-rule.3 Under Atatürk, Turkey enforced homogenization, banning Kurdish in public, closing Kurdish schools, renaming villages (1924) and forcibly relocating Kurds—even though most Kurds did not speak Turkish.4 The state criminalized Kurdish, promoted Citizen, Speak Turkish! and justified relocations as a tool to suppress identity.5 The Sheikh Sa’id Rebellion (1925), led by Kurdish nationalists and Islamists, was brutally crushed, triggering long-term conflict. Martial law and mass deportations lasted until 1939, while uprisings in Ararat (1930) and Dersim (1937–38) faced massacres, bombings, and poison gas, drawing parallels to the Armenian Genocide.6 Allegations of British support for Kurdish rebels persist, but remain debated.7 Kurdish political movements resurfaced in the 1960s and 1970s, with the Kurdish Democratic Party of Turkey (1965) and the Marxist-Leninist PKK (1978) engaging in armed resistance. Turkey designated the PKK a terrorist group in 1997, followed by the US and EU.8 Forced displacement continued, with over a million Kurds migrating between 1950 and 1980 due to state violence and poverty.9 The 1980 military coup further suppressed Kurdish politics, banning education (1982) and publications (Law No. 2932, 1983).10 Despite lifting the language ban in 1991, Kurdish broadcasting remained illegal until 2002. From 1984 to 1999, Turkey destroyed 4,000 Kurdish villages, displaced three million people, and killed tens of thousands in its campaign against Kurdish insurgency.11 The 1991 language bill allowed limited private Kurdish use, but public use remained restricted. Some progress followed in the 21st century, including Kurdish-language broadcasts (2004), a state-run TV channel (2009), and Kurdish as an optional school subject (2012), though full linguistic and cultural rights remain elusive. Oral storytelling (Dengbêj) persisted despite restrictions. Between 2013 and 2015, Turkey’s peace talks with the PKK, involving Abdullah Öcalan, PKK commanders, and pro-Kurdish HDP intermediaries, collapsed—renewing conflict in southeastern Turkey.12 Arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, torture, and land dispossession persist, as security forces often fail to distinguish civilians from PKK members.13 How is the situation today? An estimated 12–20 million Kurds live in Turkey, making up approximately 14–23% of the country's population. The wide range in estimates is due to the absence of ethnicity-related data in official statistics and the social and political stigma that may lead some to conceal their identity.14 As Kurds originate from various countries, most today identify with the state in which they reside. Surveys suggest that many Kurds feel a strong sense of discrimination. Only 28% believe they are treated equally to ethnic Turks, while 58% report experiencing discrimination. Some have even been denied medical services and housing due to their ethnicity.15 To better understand these challenges, we spoke with a Kurdish individual from Elbistan, Turkey, who spent most of his life there before relocating. When asked if he had ever felt pressure speaking Kurdish in public, he recalled visits to public institutions where his family, unable to speak Turkish, had to use Kurdish, but were not allowed to. “It always made us feel fear and anxiety”, he said. He also described restrictions on Kurdish culture: “Whenever we listened to Kurdish music or played traditional games outside, we knew we were being watched. Some of my friends were even detained just for playing games with Kurdish music. It felt like our culture was a crime.” In contrast, a Turkish conservative nationalist offered a different perspective. While personally holding nationalist views, he answered the questions in general terms, arguing that Kurds are integrated into society and do not face systemic barriers. When asked if there was tension between Turks and Kurds in daily life, he dismissed the idea: “Generalizing Turkey’s sociology is difficult, but I don’t see any real barrier. I have Kurdish friends and colleagues, and background doesn’t matter to us. In cities like Istanbul, people aren’t judged based on race, religion, language, or culture.” Even though he acknowledged past discrimination, he viewed it as a historical issue rather than an ongoing one. While the two perspectives differ, they reflect broader discussions on the extent of cultural and linguistic inclusion in Turkey. Surveys suggest that many Kurds report experiencing discrimination, while some view Kurdish cultural expression as unrestricted. The extent to which Kurdish identity is freely expressed - or whether challenges remain - continues to be a subject of debate. The survival of Kurdish culture in Turkey In a survey conducted regarding Kurdish identity, only 30% of Kurds reported their Kurdish language skills to be “good”, and of this 30%, only 44% of them reported that their children had the same strong language skills.16 This suggests that it is harder for each passing generation to maintain and teach the Kurdish language. So how has the oppression impacted Kurdish ability to maintain their language? According to the latter interviewee “Kurdish is spoken openly, cultural traditions are practiced, and there are Kurdish-language newspapers and TV channels”. Media As mentioned above, the Turkish government continuously violates the “freedom of expression”. In 2021, Turkey was the country with most cases regarding violation to “freedom of expression” before the European Court of Human Rights.17 Regarding Kurdish media, there has been a consistent crackdown on Kurdish media platforms. There has also been consistent imprisonment of journalists either writing in Kurdish or regarding Kurdish repression. For instance, Nedim Turfent was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment in 2017 for covering the clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK. In his sentence, he was charged with “membership of a terrorist organization”.18 Education The Educational accessibility to teaching Kurdish has improved in the years. Students in cities with a high population of Kurds, can choose Kurdish as a subject in primary- and secondary school. In addition, some state level universities offer Kurdish programs. However, these educational means have been greatly criticized by Kurdish activists, in regard to the government lowering the quality of education by not supplying enough teachers and appropriate materials needed for the classes.19 Final remarks Language is not just a means of communication; it embodies history, culture, and identity. The Kurdish struggle for linguistic freedom in Turkey is a fight for existence, where legal barriers and social stigmas persist despite claims of progress. While the government insists on inclusivity, Kurdish activists highlight ongoing repression, and for many, fear and anxiety remain. The future of Kurdish identity depends not just on legal reforms but on broader acceptance within Turkish society. Whether true equality is within reach - or remains a distant hope - ultimately depends on who you ask.
Av Injuria 24. april 2025
I denne utgaven: Nordtveit, Ernst - " Rettar til nausttomt " - 1982