Speaking Kurdish in Turkey: Legal right or social struggle?

Hannah M. Behncke, Eylül Sahin and Sabrina Eriksen Zapata – ELSA Bergen, Human Rights, Researchgruppen • 24. april 2025

Oppression isn’t always loud - it can be the quiet erasure of culture and language, stripping minorities of their freedom to express who they are. 


Language and culture are two of the most important means to keep one's identity alive. Unfortunately, many minorities face extreme repression regarding their background. The Kurdish ability to perform their culture in Turkey has been a long struggle. This is still the case today, where the Kurdish minority face backlash for speaking their language. 


This article will look into the Kurdish fight to protect their identity in Turkey. To gain a deeper understanding of the diverse perspectives on this issue, we interviewed a Kurdish and a Turkish citizen of Turkey about their views on the Turkish state's treatment of Kurds. 


Legal basis 


Although several international legal frameworks exist to protect minority cultures and languages, Turkey has not incorporated them into its legal system. 


Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights explicitly states that “minorities shall not be denied the right […] to enjoy their culture, [...] or to use their own language.” However, despite ratifying the ICCPR, Turkey made a reservation excluding Article 27. 


Similarly, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages requires minority languages to be accessible in education, judicial court proceedings, and in the media. However, Turkey has not ratified this charter. 


Domestically, the Turkish constitution does not recognize Kurds as a minority. In fact, article 42 explicitly prohibits the “teaching of any language other than Turkish as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens”.1 As a result, the Kurdish language lacks legal protection, unlike Ladino, Greek, and Armenian, which are safeguarded under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).2 


Historical overview 

After the Ottoman Empire's collapse, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres promised Kurdish autonomy, but the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne nullified it, dividing Kurdistan among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria without self-rule.3 

Under Atatürk, Turkey enforced homogenization, banning Kurdish in public, closing Kurdish schools, renaming villages (1924) and forcibly relocating Kurds—even though most Kurds did not speak Turkish.4 The state criminalized Kurdish, promoted Citizen, Speak Turkish! and justified relocations as a tool to suppress identity.5 


The Sheikh Sa’id Rebellion (1925), led by Kurdish nationalists and Islamists, was brutally crushed, triggering long-term conflict. Martial law and mass deportations lasted until 1939, while uprisings in Ararat (1930) and Dersim (1937–38) faced massacres, bombings, and poison gas, drawing parallels to the Armenian Genocide.6 


Allegations of British support for Kurdish rebels persist, but remain debated.7 


Kurdish political movements resurfaced in the 1960s and 1970s, with the Kurdish Democratic Party of Turkey (1965) and the Marxist-Leninist PKK (1978) engaging in armed resistance. Turkey designated the PKK a terrorist group in 1997, followed by the US and EU.8 

Forced displacement continued, with over a million Kurds migrating between 1950 and 1980 due to state violence and poverty.9 The 1980 military coup further suppressed Kurdish politics, banning education (1982) and publications (Law No. 2932, 1983).10 

Despite lifting the language ban in 1991, Kurdish broadcasting remained illegal until 2002. From 1984 to 1999, Turkey destroyed 4,000 Kurdish villages, displaced three million people, and killed tens of thousands in its campaign against Kurdish insurgency.11 The 1991 language bill allowed limited private Kurdish use, but public use remained restricted. 

Some progress followed in the 21st century, including Kurdish-language broadcasts (2004), a state-run TV channel (2009), and Kurdish as an optional school subject (2012), though full linguistic and cultural rights remain elusive. Oral storytelling (Dengbêj) persisted despite restrictions. 

Between 2013 and 2015, Turkey’s peace talks with the PKK, involving Abdullah Öcalan, PKK commanders, and pro-Kurdish HDP intermediaries, collapsed—renewing conflict in southeastern Turkey.12 

Arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, torture, and land dispossession persist, as security forces often fail to distinguish civilians from PKK members.13  


How is the situation today? 


An estimated 12–20 million Kurds live in Turkey, making up approximately 14–23% of the country's population. The wide range in estimates is due to the absence of ethnicity-related data in official statistics and the social and political stigma that may lead some to conceal their identity.14 As Kurds originate from various countries, most today identify with the state in which they reside. 

Surveys suggest that many Kurds feel a strong sense of discrimination. Only 28% believe they are treated equally to ethnic Turks, while 58% report experiencing discrimination. Some have even been denied medical services and housing due to their ethnicity.15 

To better understand these challenges, we spoke with a Kurdish individual from Elbistan, Turkey, who spent most of his life there before relocating. 


When asked if he had ever felt pressure speaking Kurdish in public, he recalled visits to public institutions where his family, unable to speak Turkish, had to use Kurdish, but were not allowed to. “It always made us feel fear and anxiety”, he said. 


He also described restrictions on Kurdish culture: “Whenever we listened to Kurdish music or played traditional games outside, we knew we were being watched. Some of my friends were even detained just for playing games with Kurdish music. It felt like our culture was a crime.” 


In contrast, a Turkish conservative nationalist offered a different perspective. While personally holding nationalist views, he answered the questions in general terms, arguing that Kurds are integrated into society and do not face systemic barriers. 


When asked if there was tension between Turks and Kurds in daily life, he dismissed the idea: “Generalizing Turkey’s sociology is difficult, but I don’t see any real barrier. I have Kurdish friends and colleagues, and background doesn’t matter to us. In cities like Istanbul, people aren’t judged based on race, religion, language, or culture.” 


Even though he acknowledged past discrimination, he viewed it as a historical issue rather than an ongoing one. 


While the two perspectives differ, they reflect broader discussions on the extent of cultural and linguistic inclusion in Turkey. Surveys suggest that many Kurds report experiencing discrimination, while some view Kurdish cultural expression as unrestricted. The extent to which Kurdish identity is freely expressed - or whether challenges remain - continues to be a subject of debate. 


The survival of Kurdish culture in Turkey 


In a survey conducted regarding Kurdish identity, only 30% of Kurds reported their Kurdish language skills to be “good”, and of this 30%, only 44% of them reported that their children had the same strong language skills.16 This suggests that it is harder for each passing generation to maintain and teach the Kurdish language. So how has the oppression impacted Kurdish ability to maintain their language? 


According to the latter interviewee “Kurdish is spoken openly, cultural traditions are practiced, and there are Kurdish-language newspapers and TV channels”. 


Media 


As mentioned above, the Turkish government continuously violates the “freedom of expression”. In 2021, Turkey was the country with most cases regarding violation to “freedom of expression” before the European Court of Human Rights.17 


Regarding Kurdish media, there has been a consistent crackdown on Kurdish media platforms. There has also been consistent imprisonment of journalists either writing in Kurdish or regarding Kurdish repression. For instance, Nedim Turfent was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment in 2017 for covering the clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK. In his sentence, he was charged with “membership of a terrorist organization”.18 


Education 


The Educational accessibility to teaching Kurdish has improved in the years. Students in cities with a high population of Kurds, can choose Kurdish as a subject in primary- and secondary school. In addition, some state level universities offer Kurdish programs. However, these educational means have been greatly criticized by Kurdish activists, in regard to the government lowering the quality of education by not supplying enough teachers and appropriate materials needed for the classes.19 


Final remarks 


Language is not just a means of communication; it embodies history, culture, and identity. The Kurdish struggle for linguistic freedom in Turkey is a fight for existence, where legal barriers and social stigmas persist despite claims of progress. While the government insists on inclusivity, Kurdish activists highlight ongoing repression, and for many, fear and anxiety remain. The future of Kurdish identity depends not just on legal reforms but on broader acceptance within Turkish society. Whether true equality is within reach - or remains a distant hope - ultimately depends on who you ask. 


Av Siggen og Begeret 1. mai 2026
Akkurat som med Snusboks-leken skal du sende en gjenstand (helst Norges Lover) til den påstanden resonerer best med. Drikk hver gang du får den, eller når rimet slapper for hardt. Splash er selvfølgelig oblig!
Av By Sabrina Eriksen-Zapata, Josefine Gløersen and Hilda Sønderland Lundanes - ELSA Bergen, Academic Activities Research Group (2025-2026) 23. april 2026
Last year’s Rafto Prize was awarded to Emergency Response Rooms of Sudan (ERRs) for their humanitarian work in the Sudanese civil war. As conflict continues to devastate the country and displace millions, ERR has played a vital role as a local humanitarian organisation. The organisation is community-driven and focuses on empowering the local community, which was one of the reasons why they were awarded the Rafto Prize1. The recognition of ERR raises questions on how local humanitarian organisations compare to international organisations in terms of efficiency, capacity and long-term sustainability. Efficiency and Structure International organisations will, to a larger degree, use international staff. However, in some cases they will employ and use staff from the country in crisis, in which they will be able to deploy their local understanding in the situation2. In the cases where international organisations do not use local staff to a great extent, there are undoubtedly several benefits of using local aid organisations instead. When comparing the efficiency and structure of humanitarian organisations, clear differences appear between local and international actors. Local actors have more cultural and contextual knowledge which allows them to use other approaches than international organisations. The Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) consortium included Somali local expertise, and thus was able to tailor the aid based on what the affected people actually needed.3 While the methods of the local actors are tailored to the specific context, international organisations often use standardised operating procedures. These procedures often prove efficient at the time of crises but can also provide a risk for unintended harm arising from the lack of understanding of local customs. International and local humanitarian aid organisations are also different in the way they are structured. The local organisations often have a vertical structure which might make it easier for them to adapt to sudden changes compared to organisations with hierarchical structures which are less flexible. Since local actors are already present in the affected area, they are able to respond quickly to sudden escalations in a current crisis. For example, ERR was based on community-led activities existing prior to the Sudanese war, which allowed them to establish immediately after the outbreak of the war.4 Because they were not dependent on foreign staff, they were able to mobilize quickly by using resources from local networks. By contrast, international organisations will to a large degree depend on international staff who have to be transported to the conflict-affected area. During the typhoon in the Philippines in 2013, the local NGOs had a more efficient first response because they were already present in the area.5 For international organisations, decisions have to pass through more levels of approval before international staff can be deployed, making it harder to be present when the crisis first emerges. International organisations may also struggle to enter the conflict-affected area because of restrictions and safety concerns while local actors have a more immediate access. Funding and legitimacy The local and international aid organizations also differ when it comes to accessing donors and funding, and areas where help is needed. The local organizations may not be well known outside of their area. This could impact their funding, as those who are willing to donate may not know of their work, or know who to trust. From the donors' point of view, it is difficult to trust that their money is going to the right causes when they have limited knowledge of the area and the different local organizations. This makes it more likely that they will choose to donate to the international organizations they know and trust. The access to donors is a great advantage for the international organizations. On the other hand, some studies suggest that local organizations might use their funding more efficiently. In 2024, The Share Trust and Refugees International in cooperation with Center for Disaster Philanthropy (CDP) published a study which showed that the local intermediaries were 15.5% more cost-efficient than the international ones in Ukraine. The study found that the UNOCHA Country Based Pooled Fund saved about $ 5.5 million in just one year.6 While the funding showed to be more efficient when going to the local actors in Ukraine this may not necessarily be the case elsewhere. In other areas the local actors will have widely different degrees of organization, and it will be difficult to predict how effective the funding will be. The funding of the organizations also shape the access they have to areas where aid is needed. This is clear when you look at the difference between MSF Doctors Without Borders and the Red Cross. MSF is based on private donations as a way to protect their independence. 7 This funding strategy also allows them to not be associated with a country’s policy, which ensures their access to multiple areas other organizations do not have access to. While they gain access by staying independent with their funding, MSF is vocal about their experiences in the areas they work. This can both be a hindrance and a benefit, depending on whether the people in power wish to be in the spotlight or not. The Red Cross on the other hand relies heavily on financial contributions from states. However, their long-term humanitarian commitment to the principle of neutrality has provided the Red Cross access to conflict areas where other international humanitarian organisations were denied access due to them publicly reporting war crimes and violations they witnessed. For instance, MSF were denied access to Darfur for publicly reporting the rape of over 500 women by soldiers, whilst the Red Cross were able to remain due to their principle of remaining silent and not reporting violations that they witnessed.8 By funding the local actors, one can circumvent the problem altogether. The local actors will have access to the area no matter where they get their funding from or what they publish about the crisis since they are already there. All in all, the funding of local actors is shown to be positive. However, at the same time they lack the legitimacy and the resources that the international aid organizations have. Empowering the affected people Scholars have also pointed out how local organisations can create a sense of ownership and empowerment in a time of crisis and war. Including the local population in humanitarian aid can help the affected people of the crisis feel a sense of control in a time of despair and hopelessness. Using local staff and collecting them together to work on infrastructural projects, or on the distribution of water, food and medicine can also create a sense of solidarity and cohesion which is incredibly important in times of war. Scholars have even suggested that creating such a space where the affected population collaborate together on their common humanity can even facilitate the discussion of peace and negotiation further down the road.9 Strengthening local organisations will also provide a more sustainable dynamic in later crises as the people can transfer knowledge, dynamics and infrastructure they have built. For instance, the BRIGHTLY consortium, combined the strengths of international aid organisations with national Yemeni organisations to empower and strengthen the local community. It put the decision-making processes in the hands of the local community which paved the way for mentoring and training.10 Not only is this empowering on a psychological level, but it is also extremely sustainable in the long-term. Therefore, this article does not intend to diminish the importance of international aid organisations. On the contrary, international aid organisations have been vital in securing life for centuries. However, as this article mentions, and seen through ERR’s hard work in Sudan, strengthening local organisations can provide aid relief in a sustainable and efficient manner, in addition to empowering the affected population in a time of crisis.